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he European Union, together with all countries, is making a second effort to reach a 
comprehensive global climate change agreement at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (COP21 or CMP11) in Paris in December 2015, after the unsuccessful 
attempt to do so in Copenhagen in 2009. 
At a time when the EU is still preoccupied with recovery from the economic crisis, and is facing 
geopolitical challenges and a number of conflicts, why should it see the importance of 
continuing to offer leadership in the field of climate change? And why would such an 
agreement be important for the EU?  In short: “What’s in it for the EU?” 
This commentary reviews the wider context of the negotiations, looking not only at the 
geopolitical shifts that have taken place on the road to Paris, but also at the interests of the EU 
both as far as its domestic climate policy is concerned, as well as its role as a diplomatic ‘soft 
power’. 
T
2 | MARCU, WITH DEPREZ, DRÖGE, GALLAGHER, GRADZIUK, OBERTHÜR & SPENCER 
 
The road to Paris 2015   
The analysis needs to take into account the changes in the international landscape, as well as 
the evolution of the views, priorities and positions of the EU since the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) in 1997, and since Copenhagen. 
Geopolitical shifts 
Since 1997, but also going back to the Rio UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in 1992, the international economic order and emissions profile have changed 
significantly, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.  
This has translated into a different balance in international relations, including in the 
negotiations of international agreements. There is increasing sophistication and knowledge 
about national positions as well as the international negotiating process from the G77 and 
China, which is reflected in the way in which negotiations are being conducted, as well as 
through the positions and options that the group is able to put forward.  
The emergence since Kyoto of groupings such as the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), 
Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) and the Independent Alliance of Latin America 
and the Caribbean (AILAC) testifies to the fragmentation and diversification, but also to the 
growing sophistication and assertiveness among developing countries. 
The EU’s view of itself, as well as that held by other observers, with respect to climate change, 
have also undergone significant changes since Rio, Kyoto and Copenhagen. For many years, 
the EU, with its membership in the KP “club”, its Climate and Energy Package, including 
carbon pricing through the EU ETS, has felt that it had a lock on leadership in climate change. 
 
Table 1. GDP ($ billions of PPP) 
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Table 2. CO2 emissions per country (in thousands of metric tonnes) 
 
 
But these perceptions have undergone recent changes. The role of China and the US has 
changed, more recently, through the November 2014 China-US announcement on climate 
change, but also in general. Both countries are undertaking domestic mitigation measures and 
have developed an increasing interest, and desire, to show leadership commensurate with 
their economic clout and geopolitical importance. 
In the meantime, the EU’s importance and confidence seem to be diminishing, in spite of being 
a 500 million people trading block and economic power, and its promises, actions and rhetoric 
to fight climate change.  
EU in action  
The EU has effectively decoupled economic growth from carbon emissions and is undergoing 
a profound and irreversible transition. It achieved a 19% reduction in GHG emissions between 
1990 and 2013, while its GDP grew by 45%. It has recently introduced its 2030 framework for 
energy and climate, which calls, among other things, for a 40% reduction to 2030, which would 
put it on a trajectory to meet its 2050 goal of an 80-95% reduction.  
The renewables target of “at least 27%” by 2030 will likely result in the increased importance 
of renewable-energy production across many EU member states in the next decade. The 
interconnection target of 15% can be expected to contribute to a continent-wide electricity grid, 
securing energy cooperation and security. And last, but not least, the energy-efficiency target 
of “at least 27%”, coupled with stronger domestic regulation in France, Germany and the UK, 
as well as increasing EU efficiency finance, should mean an important contribution to the 
overall 40% greenhouse-gas reduction target. 
The EU is making efforts to “reset” the emissions trading system (EU ETS) and return it to its 
previous role as a leading tool and an agent of change.  The European Commission has issued 
the Communication on Energy Union, which includes its intended nationally determined 
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contributions (INDCs) with a 40% reduction (second in timing only to Switzerland) in which 
decarbonisation plays an important role.  
Climate finance, and especially the Green Climate Fund (GCF), is also critical to the trust that 
is established between Parties ahead of the final months leading to Paris. The EU member 
states have pledged almost 30% of the $10 billion pledged so far. 
Action vs. rhetoric 
Viewed by EU partner countries, the EU’s performance during the last five years does not 
always live up to its rhetoric. The EU’s commitment to a higher level of ambition of a 30% 
reduction in GHGs compared to 1990 levels, which was outlined as a possibility in the 2020 
Climate and Energy Package (in the case of an international agreement in Copenhagen) is 
clearly no longer on the EU’s agenda.  
In addition, the EU has still not ratified the Kyoto Protocol’s Second Commitment Period. 
There is a point where this delay could further affect the EU’s credibility with its partners in 
the Durban coalition, especially the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). If this continues, it may have some bearing on the upcoming 
rounds of negotiations leading to Paris and the levels of trust amongst the negotiating parties. 
The EU ETS was initially designed to be the central pillar of EU climate change policy. It should 
trigger, depending on the timeframe, operational changes, in terms of dispatch order and fuel 
switching, deployment of new technologies, as well as the development of low GHG 
technologies.  
Reality has turned out to be different, with prices hovering between €6-7/tonne of CO2, and 
with the effort to rectify structural design flaws so far unable to deliver. The result seems to be 
a political compromise that will keep the EU ETS on life support, but unable to deliver what it 
was meant to do. This has not passed unobserved on the international scene and it is impacting 
the EU’s credibility. 
EU climate and energy policy in a changing world 
In the context of climate change and energy policy, the world today is very different indeed 
from the scenarios envisaged in the EU Third Energy Package and the 2020 Climate and 
Energy Framework. The assumptions included a high price for fossil fuels and a global climate 
change agreement reached in Copenhagen that would address competitive concerns and rapid 
de-carbonisation, driven by high carbon prices in the EU ETS.  
Before Copenhagen, in the 2020 package, the EU agenda was seen as a win-win scenario for 
the EU, with its energy deficit and high fossil-fuel imports. The EU agenda aimed for an 
increasingly sophisticated renewable energy industry that could lead to an industrial 
renaissance, exports and jobs, while providing leadership with the ‘soft power’ of ideas from 
the high moral ground of global environmental protection. 
Reality has turned out to be rather different, however, even if not necessarily always negative 
in terms of climate change. The economic crisis, a different energy scenario, driven by shale 
gas in the US, much lower economic activity and increasing geopolitical conflict in the EU 
neighbourhood have all negated some of those assumptions. Fossil-fuel prices turned out to 
be much lower than expected, carbon prices in the EU ETS collapsed and there was no 
Copenhagen agreement.  
This new reality has made it increasingly acceptable, if not fashionable, to question the 
rationale for the EU domestic and international positions and the leadership that it had offered. 
It must therefore come as no surprise that the issue of energy security has become much more 
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visible and central. In addition, competitiveness has been increasingly tied to the EU’s 
domestic energy and climate policies, carbon leakage (with its trade and investment 
component) and its stance on the 2015 climate change negotiations. 
What’s in it for the EU in 2015? 
Soft power 
Climate change is one of the areas where the EU is showing international leadership, which 
includes caring for the welfare of the planet and of developing countries, which are the most 
affected by climate change. The EU climate policy narrative, which includes financial 
assistance for adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries, is therefore an 
important ingredient to its status as a soft power, supporting multilateral approaches in 
particular towards sustainable development and external cooperation. 
The EU, through France, is the host of the Paris conference, and as for all hosts, this brings the 
obligation to show leadership. Delivering a successful climate summit in Paris has 
ramifications for the overall UN system.  
With climate change seen as an important and pressing matter by populations and the political 
class in a number of countries, a climate change treaty under the multilateral system will boost 
the credibility and influence of the UN and the whole multilateral system.  
Demonstrating that the multilateral system is capable of addressing such complex challenges 
as climate change, in the context of large-scale geopolitical shifts, is of great importance for the 
future of global governance. Multilateral agreement on climate change can be an example of a 
balance between great-power politics and the continuation of multilateral rules and 
frameworks. Inventing this ‘new multilateralism’ is crucial for the EU, which cannot play in 
great-power politics in the same way as China or the US.  
Finally, there is the issue of security and geopolitical conflict, which is an increasingly 
important dimension of climate change and one that is currently acknowledged by many 
security experts. For the EU, with potentially massive migration challenges, this is an 
increasing concern. A multilateral agreement on climate change provides the foundation 
elements for a more just and prosperous society, and helps contribute to addressing the 
security and geopolitical concerns of the EU. 
But the case cannot rest solely on the merits of the EU ‘providing leadership’, as a component 
of the EU’s ‘soft power’ approach alone. The justification for EU leadership must be provided 
through the concrete deliverables that a multilateral agreement will mean for the EU – 
deliverables that will bring concrete and tangible benefits.  
Given that European society sees climate as both a significant danger and a challenge, it feels 
that it is in its own interest to take action to address it. The oft-cited ‘cost of inaction’ is in itself 
a compelling case for action, but what can international leadership and an international 
agreement bring? 
Transition to a low-carbon economy and sustainable energy 
The EU has started what seems like an irreversible transition to a low-carbon economy and 
sustainable energy, and various member states have reached different stages of this 
progression. International conflicts, including the situation in Ukraine, have served to 
highlight some real, or perceived, vulnerabilities of the EU in terms of diversification and 
energy security. This also shows the increasing need for efficiency and innovation to keep EU 
industry competitive. The February 2015 Commission Communication on an Energy Union 
has highlighted strongly the connection between energy diversification and transition to a 
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low-GHG economy and the Paris 2015 climate change agreement. The Energy Union 
documents recently put forward by the European Commission put energy at the centre of EU 
priorities, in the context of climate change concerns and constraints.  
The 2015 agreement should ensure that the main trade competitors of the EU will also have to 
make commitments and take action, either at the national level or with respect to their energy 
sectors. An international coordinated transition to a more sustainable energy matrix will 
favour the EU, as it is unlikely that it will be able to compete on energy prices and will reduce 
the disruption to supply. 
A coordinated transition to a sustainable energy system can accelerate innovation and lower 
the costs of transition for all. It can also help to ensure that the commercial aspects of such a 
significant shift in the global productive system have a basis to be managed, including 
ensuring that global markets for climate-friendly goods are open and fair, and that 
participating countries benefit from reduced technology costs and positive international spill-
overs from a global transition. 
The transition needs to be sustainable and show balanced environmental progress and 
economic sustainability, including stability in energy markets. The EU cannot do this alone 
and will benefit from an international climate change agreement 
Carbon markets  
Europe’s low-carbon economy, worth €2.9 trillion and growing at 4% per year, is producing 
employment and much-needed economic growth. Europe’s economy and future prosperity 
depends on a global low carbon future. Europe’s leadership on climate action has given it 
strong commercial positions in global green technology markets. Europe sees an ambitious 
global climate agreement in Paris as critical to maintaining this economic success.  
An inclusive and ambitious Paris Agreement is essential for underpinning the growth of open 
and rules-based global markets in low carbon and green goods, services and investment from 
which all countries can benefit. 
International cooperation in many fields to combat climate change has been one of the 
fundamental tenets of EU climate change policy.  This is making carbon pricing, through a 
well-designed and liquid carbon market, possible at the domestic and international level. The 
EU ETS was designed and continues to be presented by the EU as the central pillar of its 
climate change policy. Thus it needs to be embedded in the international system also after 
2020. 
The EU ETS has served as the central hub of an international market in a number of 
jurisdictions, through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
(JI). However, the EU never intended, nor is it able, to absorb through its EU ETS all 
international units of reduction created through such systems.  
The EU had always prioritised the creation of a global carbon market, which promotes linking 
with other cap-and-trade systems, and can address competitive concerns, by ensuring that 
carbon-pricing mechanisms, and a comparative carbon price, emerge in other jurisdictions. 
This could be accomplished under the provisions of the KP, but there is no similar framework 
to help create linkages post-2020. A 2015 agreement can provide the accounting transparency, 
and assurance of quality in international transfers to address environmental integrity, 
minimise the overall cost of compliance and deal with competitive concerns.  
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Competitiveness and carbon leakage 
An international agreement can first and foremost bring transparency and comparability to 
the actions undertaken by competitors. Currently there are asymmetrical climate change 
policies around the globe, which are the result of climate change policies in a few jurisdictions 
(e.g. the EU) that impose a cost that is higher than that imposed through policies implemented 
by its trading partners. Carbon Pricing Mechanisms (CPMs) are just one manifestation of such 
policies. 
While the EU was alone for a while, that is no longer the case. California, Quebec, the US 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), as well as other CPMs in Mexico, the Republic of 
Korea and South Africa have emerged. China is preparing for one of the largest CPMs within 
the next years.  
Each jurisdiction with a CPM is concerned about the effects on its industrial competitiveness, 
and how to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage. Different carbon-leakage risk-mitigation 
measures are proposed, with free allocation being a common denominator for the time being. 
This trend will continue; no one will want to lower the ‘insurance’ that it provides to its 
industry, or lose the political peace that it buys. However, national barriers and exemptions 
through free allocation are not a long-term solution, if the goal is similar to the EU’s 85% de-
carbonisation by 2050.  
The 2015 agreement can be the foundation for an international cooperative agreement to 
address competitiveness concerns.  It is unlikely that there will be provisions to that effect in 
the Paris text, but the transparency provisions will make further discussions leading to the 
next round of commitments much more feasible. The EU is amongst the parties who will 
benefit most from such an approach. 
Reflections 
In a changing geopolitical landscape, the EU relies on soft power. While the EU’s position as 
a leader is not as unrivalled as it used to be, an effective, credible and ambitious climate 
agreement after 2020 would help to preserve this position. This includes bringing the UN 
negotiations in Paris to a successful end and playing an active part in designing a long-lasting 
international agreement.  
The EU is moving fast to decarbonise its economy and would benefit from a global agreement 
that can help address its real concerns regarding competitiveness and the transition to a low-
carbon economy and sustainable energy. International cooperation provides a good basis for 
developing a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient; the introduction of carbon pricing 
would be also greatly facilitated by the existence of an international framework and global 
climate change agreement. 
The case for EU leadership and ambition needs to be reiterated and made clear in order to 
ensure that the leaders, the political class and the public at large continue to be supportive. 
Good global citizenship and self-interest are not mutually exclusive arguments, and both need 
to be emphasised. 
 
